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Abstract 
This study investigates linkages between environmental degradation, globalisation and 
governance in 44 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa using data for the period 2000-2012. The 
Generalised Method of Moments is employed as empirical strategy. Environmental 
degradation is proxied by carbon dioxide emissions whereas globalisation is appreciated in 
terms of trade openness and net foreign direct investment inflows. Bundled and unbundled 
governance indicators are used, namely: political governance (consisting of political 
stability/no violence and “voice & accountability”), economic governance (encompassing 
government effectiveness and regulation quality), institutional governance (entailing 
corruption-control and the rule of law) and general governance (a composite measurement of 
political governance, economic governance and institutional governance). The following main 
finding is established. Trade openness modulates carbon dioxide emissions to have positive 
net effects on political stability, economic governance, the rule of law and general 
governance.  
 
JEL Classification: C52; O38; O40; O55; P37  
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1. Introduction 
How does globalisation and environmental degradation affect domestic governance in sub-
Saharan Africa? The question that motivates the present research builds on at least four 
features in the scholarly literature, notably: (i) the ineluctable phenomenon of globalisation; 
(ii) the relevance of environmental sustainability in the post-2015 era of Sustainable 
Development Goals; (iii) the importance of enhanced governance standards in the sub-region 
and (iv) gaps in the attendant literature. These features are expanded in the subsequent 
paragraphs.  
 First, there are growing calls in policy and scholarly circles for globalisation to be 
given a human face (UN, 2013; Asongu, 2013; Stiglitz, 2007; Kenneth & Himes, 2008). 
According to the narrative, globalisation is an ineluctable process that can only be stopped at 
the price of putting the prosperity of people and nations in danger. Accordingly, the 
phenomenon is threatening domestic governments and the emancipation of the citizens 
because it promotes self-interest by prioritising the domination of markets over domestic 
governments' interests. In essence, while the phenomenon of globalisation has been 
empirically established to influence domestic governance standards (Klitgaard, 1988; 
Farazmand, 1999; Lalountas, Manolas & Vavouras, 2011; Asongu, Efobi & Tchamyou, 
2018a), it has also been recently documented to be the principal driver of carbon dioxide 
emissions (You & Lv, 2018).   
 Second, carbon dioxide emissions which are at an all time high (McGrath, 2018) 
represent a considerable challenge to environmental sustainability in the light of Sustainable 
Development Goals which centre on the promotion of the green economy (Asongu, le Roux & 
Biekpe, 2017, 2018b; Efobi et al., 2019). McGrath (2018) further maintains that net outputs 
from green growth are not enough to dampen the growing pollution of the environment. 
According to the author, these carbon dioxide emissions are principally determined by two 
main tendencies: (i) globalization-oriented policies. (ii) Measures aimed at promoting the 
green economy which, are more traceable to efforts from domestic governments rather than 
from multinational companies. The underlying concerns are most relevant to sub-Saharan 
Africa because three key factors motivating this research are very apparent in the sub-region. 
(i) Sub-Saharan Africa is contributing less to World Trade compared to the 1960s (Fofack, 
2014). (ii) The consequences of rising carbon dioxide emissions are projected to be most 
detrimental in sub-Saharan Africa (Kifle, 2008; Apkan & Apkan, 2012; Shurig, 2015; Asongu 
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& Odhiambo, 2019a). (iii) The sub-regionis characterised by the least standards of 
governance in the world (Asongu, 2014a;  Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b).  
 Third, it is relevant to improve governance standards in sub-Saharan Africa because 
good governance has been established to enhance economic development outcomes on a 
multitude of fronts, notably in: societal change (Efobi, 2015) and more effective management 
of economic resources (Fosu, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014). 
Fourth, the attendant literature has substantially focused on the environmental 
degradation consequences of low political will and poor governance. Some studies supporting  
this view include: Jones (2003), Odhiambo (2009a, 2009b, 2010), Afful-Koomson (2012), 
Apkan and Akpan (2012),  Hongwu (2013),  Chemutai (2009),  Anyangwe (2014), Odhiambo 
(2014a, 2014b), Akinyemi, Alege, Osabuohien and Ogundipe (2015), Jarrett (2017),  
Akinyemi, Efobi, Asongu and Osabuohien (2018), Asongu (2018a) and Efobi et al. 
(2019).This research departs from the mainstream literature by investigating the relevance of 
carbon dioxide emissions in domestic governance, continent on globalization. Hence the 
question this research aims to answer is the following: how do globalization-driven carbon 
dioxide emissions affect governance standards in sub-Saharan Africa? 
With respect to African-centric literature, the studies closest to this paper are Asongu 
(2018b) and Asongu et al. (2018a) which have respectively, established the connection 
between globalization and carbon dioxide emissions and the relationship between 
globalization and governance. In essence, Asongu (2018b) has investigated linkages between 
information and communication technology, globalization and carbon dioxide emissions 
while Asongu et al. (2018a) have contributed to the empirics by establishing that various 
components of globalization affect governance dynamics. The current research builds on 
these two studies in the light of the identified shortcomings in the environmental degradation 
literature, to assess how globalization-moderated carbon dioxide emissions influence 
governance standards in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 In order to improve room for policy implications, six governance dynamics from the 
World Governance Indicators of the World Bank (i.e. political stability/no violence, “voice & 
accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-control and the rule 
of law) are bundled to produce additional composite governance measurements (i.e. political 
governance, economic governance, institutional governance and general governance). 
According to the attendant literature: “The first concept is about the process by which those in 
authority are selected and replaced (Political Governance): voice and accountability and 
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political stability. The second has to do with the capacity of government to formulate and 
implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic Governance): regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness. The last, but by no means least, regards the respect for citizens and 
the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them (Institutional Governance): 
rule of law and control of corruption” (Andres, Asongu & Amavilah, 2015, p. 1041). 
The purpose of bundling and unbundling governance indicators is motivated by 
evolutions in the measurement, conception and use of the term “governance” in scientific 
scholarly reporting. For example, in the light of the definitions provided in the preceding 
paragraph from Andrés et al. (2015), it is inappropriate to employ the term “economic 
governance” in scholarly reporting unless it is measured with constituent indicators of 
government effectiveness and regulation quality. Therefore, it is for the purpose of limiting 
conceptual conflation that the engaged governance dynamics are bundled through principal 
component analysis. Such bundling innovations enable the definition and conception of 
governance indicators to be consistent with measurements in scholarly reporting. A good 
illustration in the literature, of a study which has conflated the conception and measurement 
of governance is Kangoye (2013). While Kangoye (2013) uses corruption in the empirical 
exercise, the narratives are discussed in terms of general governance. According to the context 
of the present research, corruption-control is only a dimension of institutional governance and 
institutional governance is also only a dimension of general governance.  In the light of the 
attendant critique, this study argues that the term “general governance” can only be used in 
narratives if it is a composite measurement consisting of political stability, “voice & 
accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-control and the rule 
of law (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019b).  
 In the light of the three main categories of governance dynamics covered in this study, 
the intuition for globalisation in modulating “environmental degradation”-driven governance 
can be discussed in three main strands. First, from the perspective of political governance, we 
argue that environmental degradation can influence political governance because it can affect 
civil unrests and demand for “voice & accountability” in the manner in which, elected leaders 
take decisions on issues surrounding environmental standards. The associated connection 
between environmental degradation and political governance is even more apparent when 
trade and foreign direct investment processes are involved. Accordingly, multinational and 
domestic companies (through trade and investments) participate in environmental quality and 
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the citizens are very likely to demand better political governance when environmental 
standards are poor. 
 Second, environmental degradation from globalization activities can also influence 
governance in the perspective that, leaders respond by improving economic governance 
through inter alia: the formulation and implementation of policies that effectively deliver 
public commodities, such as health, education and transport facilities. Third, the respect of the 
State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them (i.e. institutional 
governance) can also be improved from interactions between globalization and environmental 
degradation. Accordingly, such interactions can be associated with corruption and disrespect 
of the rule of law. Hence, in response, institutional governance is likely to be improved.  
In the light of the above, this research anticipates an overall positive net effect on 
governance standards from the role of globalization in modulating the relationship between 
environmental degradation and governance. Given the intuition motivating this study, the 
research is aligned with a framework of theory-building. Therefore, consistent with 
contemporary empirical research, this study is in accordance with arguments that applied 
econometrics is not exclusively motivated by the need to accept or reject existing theoretical 
underpinnings (Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). Hence, 
the research argues that applied econometrics based on sound intuition is also a useful 
scientific activity that can lead to theory-building. 
The anticipated theoretical insights are broadly consistent with Farazmand (2004) and  
Farazmand and Pinkowski (2006) on nexuses between globalization, institutional 
ramifications and macroeconomic outcomes such as global insecurity, national sovereignty, 
income inequality as well as public and environmental health.  Accordingly, beyond the 
concern of governance which is used as the outcome variable in this study, Farazmand (2004) 
and Farazmand and Pinkowski (2006) also document that globalization is linked to the 
independent variable of interest used in this study (i.e. carbon dioxide emissions) by 
articulating that globalization is directly linked to concerns of sustainable development such 
as climate change and the sustainable use of energy.  
The rest of the research proceeds as follows. Section 2 covers the data and the 
methodology. The empirical results are disclosed and discussed in Section 3 while Section 4 
concludes with future research directions.  
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2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data  
The study is focused on 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa using data from 2000 to 20121. 
The geographical and temporal scopes of the research are contingent on data availability 
constraints at the time of the study. The data come from five main sources. (i) The six 
governance indicators (political stability/no violence, “voice & accountability”, government 
effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-control and the rule of law) are obtained from 
World Governance Indicators of the World Bank. (ii) The additional four composite 
governance indicators (political, economic, institutional and general governance) are obtained 
from principal component analysis. (iii) A control variable (i.e. credit access) comes from the 
Financial Development and Structure Database  of the World Bank. (iv) The carbon dioxide 
emission variable, globalization indicators (i.e. trade openness and foreign direct investment) 
and two control variables (i.e. education and foreign aid) are from World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank.  (v) A control variable (i.e. inequality-adjusted human 
development) is sourced from the United Nations Development Program.  
 “Carbon dioxide emissions per capita” is adopted as the environmental degradation 
variable while trade openness and foreign direct investment are appreciated in the terms of 
respectively, “imports plus exports” and net foreign direct investment inflows. The choice of 
these variables is motivated by contemporary environmental pollution literature (Asongu, 
2018b).   
 The governance indicators which have been defined in the introduction are from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). They are increasingly being used in the African 
governance literature: Oluwatobi, Efobi, Olurinola and Alege (2015), Ajide and Raheem 
(2016a, 2016b) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017).  
 Four main control variables are adopted in order to account for variable omission bias, 
namely: education quality, credit access, foreign aid and inclusive development. While 
inclusive development is expected to promote governance, education and foreign aid are 
expected to have the opposite effects while the anticipated impact from credit access cannot 
                                                          
1The 44 countries are: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic. Republic., Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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be established with certainty because it is contingent on whether such credit access is limited 
to the rich fractions of the population or not. 
 Whereas Okada and Samreth (2012) have concluded that foreign aid reduces 
corruption in developing nations, Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) have used the six 
governance variables employed in this research to establish that foreign aid reduces 
governance standards in Africa. The education quality indicator is measured as the pupils-
teacher ratio. Hence, a negative effect is anticipated on governance quality because the 
variable reflects a policy syndrome. This is essentially because a higher ratio reflects poor 
education quality since more pupils are accommodated by fewer teachers. The choice of 
primary education, relative to other measures (or higher levels of education) has two main 
motivations. On the one hand, there are data availability constraints in the other levels of 
education. On the other hand, the primary level of education has been documented to be more 
associated with development externalities when countries are at initial levels of 
industrialisation. Some studies supporting this thesis are: Asiedu (2014) and Petrakis and 
Stamatakis (2002).  
In recent African development literature, Asongu and le Roux (2019) have shown that 
inclusive development promotes good governance. The definitions and sources of the 
variables are provided in Appendix 1 while the summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. 
Appendix 3 presents the correlation matrix.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1Principal Component Analysis  
 In accordance with the motivation of the study, in order to improve room for policy 
implications, the governance variables are bundled with principal component analysis. The 
relevance of bundling governance indicators in order to improve options for policy makers is 
consistent with recent literature, notably: Tchamyou (2017) and Asongu, le Roux, 
Nwachukwu and Pyke (2019). Four composite indicators are derived from the principal 
component analysis:  (i) political stability/no violence and “voice & accountability” are 
reduced to political governance; (ii) government effectiveness and regulation quality are 
reduced to economic governance; (iii) corruption-control and the rule of law are reduced to 
institutional governance and (iv) political stability/no violence, “voice & accountability”, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-control and the rule of law are 
reduced to general governance.  
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 The criterion used to select common factors is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). 
They recommend that common factors should be retained if they have an eignenvalue greater 
than the mean and reflect about 70% of common information in constituent variables. The 
results of the principal component analysis are disclosed in Table 1. It is apparent from the 
table that the discussed criterion is fulfilled because: political governance, institutional 
governance, economic governance and general governance respectively, reflect eigenvalues 
(variations) of  1.671, 1.861, 1.878 and 4.892 (83.5 %, 93.0 %, 93.9 % and 81.50%). 
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis for Governance 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.395 0.372 0.411 0.426 0.439 0.404 0.815 0.815 4.892 
Second  PC -0.037 0.873 -0.357 -0.303 0.037 -0.124 0.067 0.883 0.407 
Third PC 0.747 -0.035 0.157 -0.131 -0.086 -0.626 0.052 0.935 0.314 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Econgov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
2.2.2 GMM: Specification, identification and exclusion restrictions  
 This research borrows from recent literature on the motivation for employing the 
Generalised Method of Moments because such motives are consistent with the data behavior 
and modeling approach for this research. In accordance with the attendant literature 
(Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c; Fosu  & Abass, 2019), the choice 
of this empirical strategy is informed by four main factors. First, the governance dynamics 
(i.e. the outcome variables) are persistent given that the correlation between their level values 
and first lagged values is higher than 0.800, which is the rule of thumb for establishing such 
persistence (Tchamyou et al., 2019; Boateng, Asongu, Akamavi & Tchamyou, 2018). Second, 
N (i.e. the number of countries) is higher than T (i.e. the number of periods in each country). 
Third, given the panel data structure of the study, cross-country variations are considered in 
the estimation exercise. Fourth, the issue of endogeneity is addressed from two main 
perspectives. On the one hand, an instrumentation process is employed to account for 
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simultaneity or reverse causality. On the other hand, the unobserved heterogeneity is taken on 
board because the estimation process controls from time-invariant variables and by extension, 
cross sectional dependence.  
 The Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) is employed in 
this study because in the light of contemporary literature, it limits the proliferation of 
instruments and has more efficient properties.  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiG , is a governance (political stability, voice & accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law and corruption-control, political governance, 
economic governance, institutional governance and general governance) variable of  country 
i in  period t , 0 is a constant, C represents carbon dioxide emissions, O  entails openness 
(trade openness and financial openness), CO  denotes an interaction between a carbon dioxide 
emission variable and openness (“carbon dioxide emissions” × “trade openness” and “carbon 
dioxide emissions” × “financial openness”), W  is the vector of control variables (education, 
credit, foreign aid and inclusive development), represents the coefficient of auto-regression 
which is one within the framework of this study because a year lag is enough to capture past 
information, t is the time-specific constant, i
 
is the country-specific effect and ti , is the 
error term.  
 
2.2.3 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
  
 The identification and exclusion narrative in this research is broadly consistent with 
recent literature which has employed the Generalised Method of Moments approach, notably: 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016d), Tchamyou and Asongu (2017), Meniago and Asongu 
(2018), Tchamyou et al. (2019) and Boateng et al. (2018).According to the attendant strategy, 
years or time-invariant variables are considered as strictly exogenous variables while all the 
explanatory indicators are acknowledged as predetermined. Roodman (2009b) is sympathetic 
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with this identification strategy because the author has argued that it is unfeasible for time-
invariant variables to be endogenous upon a first difference2.  
 The exclusive restrictions and identification frameworks are aligned in the 
perspectives that, the strictly exogenous variables influence the outcome variable exclusively 
through the predetermined variables. The underlying assumption of exclusion restriction is 
assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test. The null hypothesis of this test is the position 
that the instruments are valid and the exclusion restriction assumption is validated if the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. While this information criterion on exclusion restriction is that 
which is used in the Generalised Method of Moments with forward orthogonal deviations, the 
strategy is not different from a standard instrumental variable  strategy in which, a rejection of 
the null hypothesis of the Sargan test implies that the instruments are not valid (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b).  
 
3. Presentation of results 
3.1 Empirical results  
 This section discloses the empirical results. Table 2 presents nexuses between 
globalization, environmental degradation and political governance while Table 3 shows 
findings on linkages between globalization, environmental degradation and economic 
governance. The findings in Table 4 are connections between globalization, environmental 
degradation and institutional governance, whereas the focus of Table 5 is on globalization, 
environmental degradation and general governance. With the exception of Table 5 which 
focuses on general governance, Table 2-4 entail three sets of specifications pertaining to each 
governance dynamic. In each table, the first-two specifications are constituents of the 
composite governance indicator derived from principal component analysis. The last 
specification is therefore the composite indicator from the principal component analysis. Each 
specification set entails two main regressions pertaining to trade-linked and “foreign direct 
investment”-oriented estimations.  
In order to assess the validity of estimated models, four information criteria are 
used3.Based on these criteria, some models do not pass post-estimation diagnostic tests, 
                                                          
2Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
3
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
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notably: (i) the fourth and sixth columns of Table 2; (ii) the first-three specifications of Table 
3; (iii) the last-four specifications of Table 4 and (iv) the fourth column of Table 5.  
 
Table 2: Globalisation, Carbon dioxide emissions and Political Governance 
       
 Dependent variable:  Political Governance  
       
 Political Stability (PS) Voice & Accountability (VA) Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
 Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. 
Political Stability (-1) 0.836*** 0.906*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Voice & Accountability (-1) --- --- 0.995*** 0.989*** --- --- 
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Political Governance (-1)  --- --- --- --- 0.939*** 0.946*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade Globalization (Trade) -0.001 --- -0.001*** --- -0.001 --- 
 (0.213)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Financial Globalization (Fin) --- -0.0004 --- -0.0008*** --- -0.0007* 
  (0.480)  (0.000)  (0.097) 
CO2 emissions (CO2) 0.051* -0.005 -0.075*** -0.009 -0.016 0.023 
 (0.090) (0.781) (0.000) (0.140) (0.612) (0.376) 
CO2 ×Trade -0.0005** --- 0.0004*** --- -0.00004 --- 
 (0.032)  (0.000)  (0.866)  
CO2× Fin --- -0.0003 --- -0.001** --- -0.002** 
  (0.604)  (0.026)  (0.044) 
Education  -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.001 0.0002 -0.007*** -0.004* 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.173) (0.870) (0.000) (0.086) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.002** -0.001* 0.0009 0.001** -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.030) (0.077) (0.371) (0.024) (0.594) (0.723) 
Foreign Aid -0.001* -0.0007 0.0005* 0.0002 0.00007 -0.0001 
 (0.089) (0.211) (0.057) (0.402) (0.851) (0.736) 
Inclusive Development  0.407 0.345 0.537** 0.178 0.767*** 0.059 
 (0.344) (0.370) (0.011) (0.273) (0.005) (0.829) 
       
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects 0.0126 na nsa na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.012) (0.015) (0.102) (0.113) (0.027) (0.026) 
AR(2) (0.196) (0.247) (0.154) (0.272) (0.448) (0.493) 
Sargan OIR (0.748) (0.713) (0.003) (0.009) (0.296) (0.538) 
Hansen OIR (0.133) (0.435) (0.069) (0.115) (0.070) (0.248) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.394) (0.193) (0.021) (0.004) (0.193) (0.008) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.117) (0.525) (0.235) (0.608) (0.084) (0.758) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.259) (0.276) (0.008) (0.047) (0.056) (0.243) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.140) (0.614) (0.851) (0.533) (0.284) (0.340) 
       
Fisher  22400.92*** 339.78*** 4302.11*** 4587.48*** 10925.49*** 23052.72*** 
Instruments  39 39 39 39 39 39 
Countries  41 41 41 41 41 41 
Observations  211 213 211 213 211 213 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions.The mean value of trade openness is 76.759 while 
the mean value of financial openness is 5.381. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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One common feature in the invalid models is that the Hansen test is rejected. It is 
worthwhile to articulate that the Sargan test is not robust but not weakened by instrument 
proliferation whereas the Hansen test is robust and weakened by instrument proliferation. A 
means of dealing with the conflicting information criteria is to adopt the Hansen test and then 
ensure that instrument proliferation is limited. Such instrument proliferation is restricted by 
ensuring that the number of cross sections is higher than the number of instruments in each 
specification.   
In line with the research question motivating this study, in order to assess how 
globalisation modulates “environmental degradation”-driven governance, net effects are 
computed from estimated models that are valid. These net effects consist of the both the 
unconditional effects of environmental degradation and the corresponding conditional impact 
which entails the interaction between environmental degradation and a globalization dynamic. 
For instance in the second column of Table 2, the net impact of trade in modulating the 
importance of carbon dioxide emissions in political stability 0.0126 ([-0.0005× 76.759] + 
[0.051]). In this computation, the mean value of trade openness is 76.759, the unconditional 
effect of carbon dioxide emissions is 0.051 while the conditional impact from the interactions 
between carbon dioxide emissions and trade openness is -0.0005. This computation 
framework is consistent with recent literature on interactive regressions (Agoba, Abor, Osei, 
& Sa-Aadu, 2019; Tchamyou, 2019b). 
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Table 3: Globalisation, Carbon dioxide emissions and Economic Governance 
       
 Dependent variable:  Economic Governance  
       
 Regulation Quality 
 (RQ)  
Government Effectiveness 
(GE)  
Economic Governance 
(Ecogov) 
    
 Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. 
Regulation Quality  (-1) 0.859*** 0.863*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Government Effectiveness (-1) --- --- 0.859*** 0.863*** --- --- 
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Economic Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.881*** 0.906*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade Globalization (Trade) -0.0004* --- -0.001*** --- -0.002*** --- 
 (0.067)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Financial Globalization (Fin) --- -0.001*** --- -0.001*** --- -0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
CO2 emissions (CO2) 0.164*** -0.008 0.103*** -0.0002 0.290*** -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.198) (0.002) (0.977) (0.000) (0.784) 
CO2 ×Trade -0.001*** --- -0.0008** --- -0.002*** --- 
 (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.000)  
CO2× Fin --- 0.002*** --- -0.0002 --- 0.002** 
  (0.000)  (0.736)  (0.011) 
Education  -0.002*** -0.0008 -0.001 -0.002** -0.004** -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.237) (0.113) (0.028) (0.024) (0.298) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.002** 0.002*** -0.002*** 0.0006 -0.007*** 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.009) (0.193) (0.000) (0.118) 
Foreign Aid -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0004 -0.0006*** -0.00006 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.142) (0.008) (0.869) (0.000) 
Inclusive Development  0.490*** -0.021 0.846*** 0.413** 1.665*** 0.421 
 (0.000) (0.910) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.250) 
 
 
 
   
 
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects nsa nsa nsa na 0.1364 na 
       
AR(1) (0.017) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
AR(2) (0.170) (0.131) (0.919) (0.415) (0.660) (0.865) 
Sargan OIR (0.033) (0.001) (0.089) (0.004) (0.101) (0.001) 
Hansen OIR (0.028) (0.028) (0.057) (0.117) (0.245) (0.208) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.016) (0.023) (0.030) (0.012) (0.052) (0.091) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.123) (0.102) (0.170) (0.429) (0.474) (0.342) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.034) (0.005) (0.053) (0.019) (0.093) (0.053) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.168) (0.649) (0.242) (0.834) (0.684) (0.793) 
       
Fisher  26319.03*** 18126.65*** 3887.09*** 4245.93*** 14161.67*** 7535.81*** 
Instruments  39 39 39 39 39 39 
Countries  41 41 41 41 41 41 
Observations  211 213 211 213 211 213 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant.Constants are involved in the regressions. The mean value of trade openness is 76.759 while 
the mean value of financial openness is 5.381. 
 
The following findings are established from Tables 2-5. In Table 2, trade openness 
modulates carbon dioxide emissions to induce a positive net effect on political stability. In 
Table 3, trade openness moderates carbon dioxide emissions to have a net positive impact on 
economic governance. In Table 4, trade openness modulates carbon dioxide emissions to 
exert a positive net impact on the rule of law. In Table 5, trade openness moderates carbon 
dioxide emissions for a positive net impact on general governance. The significant control 
variables have the expected signs.  
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Table 4: Globalisation, Carbon dioxide emissions and Institutional Governance 
       
 Dependent variable:  Institutional Governance  
       
 Rule of  Law  
(RL)  
Corruption Control  
 (CC)  
Institutional Governance 
(Instgov) 
    
 Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. 
Rule of Law (-1) 1.012*** 0.968*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Corruption Control  (-1) --- --- 0.826*** 0.839*** --- --- 
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Institutional  Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.931*** 0.924*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade Globalization (Trade) 0.0008*** --- -0.001* --- -0.001 --- 
 (0.001)  (0.094)  (0.217)  
Financial Globalization (Fin) --- 0.0009*** --- -0.002*** --- -0.0005 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.492) 
CO2 emissions (CO2) 0.032** -0.010** -0.029 -0.033*** -0.007 -0.043** 
 (0.037) (0.047) (0.274) (0.002) (0.792) (0.013) 
CO2 ×Trade -0.0002*** --- 0.00009 --- -0.0002 --- 
 (0.007)  (0.628)  (0.257)  
CO2× Fin --- -0.00002 --- -0.00009 --- -0.001 
  (0.497)  (0.937)  (0.526) 
Education  -0.001** -0.001 0.001 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.006*** 
 (0.014) (0.192) (0.436) (0.002) (0.516) (0.001) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.001*** 0.0001 0.0005 0.0009* -0.001 0.0009 
 (0.009) (0.623) (0.569) (0.086) (0.237) (0.363) 
Foreign Aid -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.0006* 0.0005 -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.052) (0.504) (0.001) 
Inclusive Development  -0.193** 0.002 1.183*** 0.825*** 1.414*** 0.835*** 
 (0.045) (0.974) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) 
       
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects 0.0166 na nsa nsa nsa nsa 
       
AR(1) (0.044) (0.042) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.887) (0.924) (0.235) (0.244) (0.936) (0.883) 
Sargan OIR (0.120) (0.083) (0.054) (0.000) (0.070) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.301) (0.140) (0.067) (0.042) (0.087) (0.061) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.209) (0.071) (0.010) (0.010) (0.034) (0.023) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.358) (0.263) (0.300) (0.213) (0.233) (0.201) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.255) (0.180) (0.035) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.464) (0.222) (0.390) (0.266) (0.504) (0.391) 
       
Fisher  34449.88*** 19661.11*** 58956.15*** 5130.67*** 12904.88*** 20906.48*** 
Instruments  39 39 39 39 39 39 
Countries  41 41 41 41 41 41 
Observations  211 213 211 213 211 213 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant.Constants are involved in the regressions. The mean value of trade openness is 76.759 while 
the mean value of financial openness is 5.381. 
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Table 5: Globalisation, Carbon dioxide emissions and General Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are involved in the regressions. The mean value of trade openness is 76.759 while 
the mean value of financial openness is 5.381. 
 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 
 This study investigates linkages between environmental degradation, globalisation and 
governance in 44 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa using data for the period 2000-2012. The 
Generalised Method of Moments is employed as empirical strategy. Environmental 
     
 Dependent variable:  General Governance  
   
 Trade G. Financial  G. 
General Governance (-1) 0.935*** 0.978*** 0.954***   0.950*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade Globalization (Trade) -0.0009 -0.0005 --- --- 
 (0.613) (0.517)   
Financial Globalization (Fin) --- --- -0.0009 -0.002** 
   (0.787) (0.020) 
CO2 emissions (CO2) 
-0.015 0.147*** -0.001 -0.044** 
 (0.690) (0.001) (0.951) (0.020) 
CO2 ×Trade 0.0008* -0.001*** --- --- 
 (0.095) (0.000)   
CO2× Fin 
--- --- 0.002*** 0.002 
 
  (0.033) (0.194) 
Education  0.001 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.004* 
 (0.786) (0.880) (0.758) (0.084) 
Private Domestic Credit  0.003 -0.005** 0.001 0.0009 
 (0.169) (0.015) (0.505) (0.557) 
Foreign Aid 
--- 0.0004 --- -0.001** 
 
 (0.612)  (0.010) 
Inclusive Development  
--- 1.815*** --- 1.099*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Net effects na 0.0702 nsa na 
     
AR(1) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) 
AR(2) (0.590) (0.935) (0.549) (0.842) 
Sargan OIR (0.114) (0.083) (0.032) (0.007) 
Hansen OIR (0.157) (0.167) (0.015) (0.154) 
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group --- (0.072) --- (0.013) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.397) (0.305) (0.134) (0.514) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.077) (0.034) (0.022) (0.136) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.364) (0.821) (0.084) (0.325) 
     
Fisher  734.64*** 11138.32*** 727.92*** 63709.86*** 
Instruments  31 39 43 39 
Countries  43 41 31 41 
Observations  251 211 253 213 
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degradation is proxied by carbon dioxide emissions whereas the globalisation is appreciated 
in terms of trade openness and net foreign direct investment inflows. Bundled and unbundled 
governance indicators are used, namely: political governance (consisting of political 
stability/no violence and “voice & accountability”), economic governance (encompassing 
government effectiveness and regulation quality), institutional governance (entailing 
corruption-control and the rule of law) and general governance (a composite measurement of 
political governance, economic governance and institutional governance). The following main 
finding is established. Trade openness modulates carbon dioxide emissions to have positive 
net effects on political stability, economic governance, the rule of law and general 
governance.  
 The interest of unbundling governance dynamics is relevant in these findings because 
trade openness effectively modulates carbon dioxide emissions to induce positive net effects 
on some composite governance indicators while it does not on their constituent elements and 
vice versa. For instance, while it is appropriate to associate the underlying interactions with 
economic governance, the corresponding association is not appropriate with the constituents 
of economic governance (i.e. government effectiveness and regulation quality). Moreover, the 
relevance of the interactions on political stability (i.e. a component of political governance) 
and the rule of law (i.e. a component of institutional governance) cannot be respectively, 
extended to political governance and institutional governance. These clarifications are 
consistent with the motivation of this research of aligning the empirical exercise with progress 
in the conception, definition and measurement of governance dynamics, in order to avoid 
conceptual conflation and misplaced policy implications.  
 Another factor in the findings worth discussing is the fact that some of the models are 
not valid, especially in “foreign direct investment”-oriented regressions. There are two 
possible explanations to this tendency: one is ethical and the other is scholarly.  On the ethical 
front, had this research exclusively focused on the trade dimension of globalization, most of 
the estimated models would have been significant with worthwhile net effects. However, the 
study has maintained or reported the “foreign direct investment”-oriented regressions in order 
to avoid the “file drawer” problem in scientific scholarly reporting, notably: the exclusive 
reporting of strong, significant and expected results and consignment of weak, insignificant 
and unexpected results to the file drawer (Rosenberg, 2015; Franco, Malhotra & Simonovits, 
2014; Boateng et al., 2018). Moreover, by reporting the “foreign direct investment”-oriented 
results, this study is consistent with the view that insignificant and weak results have as much 
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economic significance and policy relevance as significant and strong findings. Hence, there is 
a scholarly explanation to the “foreign direct investment”-oriented findings. 
 On the scholarly front, differences in the role of trade openness vis-à-vis financial 
openness can be traceable to the debate over the importance on globalization in economic 
development outcomes in developing countries. According to the attendant literature, while 
there is a consensus on the beneficial effects of trade openness in economic development, the 
benefits of financial openness are still subject to intense debates in scholarly circles, 
especially because of recurrent financial crises that are increasing in magnitude and scale 
(Prasad & Rajan, 2008; Kose, Prasad& Taylor, 2011; Asongu, 2014b, 2017; Price & Elu, 
2014; Motelle & Biekpe, 2015).  
 The main caveat in the study is that the Generalised Methods of Moment approach is 
not tailored to account for country-specific effects because these effects are theoretically 
inconsistent with the application of the empirical approach. Accordingly, country-specific 
effects are eliminated in order to avoid endogeneity concerns related to the correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable and country-specific effects. It is therefore worthwhile 
for future studies to assess whether the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny when 
relevant empirical approaches are used to engage country-specific studies. Moreover, it would 
also be worthwhile for future studies to focus on sound governance (as opposed to good 
governance) by building on insights from Farazmand (2004). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
CO2 per capita CO2mtpc CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Political Stability  
 PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
 
 
  
Voice & Accountability  VA “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Political Governance  Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
PCA 
    
 
Government Effectiveness 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Regulation  Quality  RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Economic Governance  Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate & 
implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
 
 
  
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
 
 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
 
Corruption-Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Institutional Governance  Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
 
   
General Governance  Ggov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Trade Openness  Trade  Exports plus Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial Openness  FDI Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Educational Quality Educ Pupil teacher ratio in Primary Education  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Credit Access   Credit  Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid NODA Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inclusive Development  IHDI Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index  UNDP 
   
 
WDI: World Development Indicators. WGI: World Governance Indicators. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. UNDP: 
United Nations Development Program.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
CO2 per capita 0.911 1.842 0.016 10.093 532 
Political Stability  -0.486 0.923 -2.660 1.192 496 
Voice & Accountability  -0.543 0.687 -1.838 0.986 496 
Political Governance  0.140 1.230 -2.653 2.583 496 
Government Effectiveness  -0.697 0.584 -1.960 0.934 496 
Regulation Quality  -0.604 0.542 -2.110 0.983 496 
Economic Governance  0.205 1.225 -2.288 3.807 496 
Rule of Law -0.663 0.614 -2.113 1.056 496 
Corruption-Control -0.590 0.565 -1.566 1.249 496 
Institutional Governance  0.144 1.282 -2.391 3.766 496 
General Governance  0.284 2.040 -4.567 5.561 496 
Trade  Openness  76.759 35.381 20.964 209.874 519 
Financial Openness  5.381 8.834 -6.043 91.007 529 
Educational Quality  43.892 14.775 12.466 100.236 397 
Credit Access  19.142 23.278 0.550 149.78 458 
Foreign  Aid 11.944 14.712 -0.253 181.187 531 
Inclusive Development  0.450 0.110 0.219 0.768 431 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 267) 
                  
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance  Openness Control variables  
 PolS VA Pol 
gov 
GE RQ Eco 
gov 
RL CC Inst 
gov 
G.gov Trade FDI Edu Credit NODA IHDI CO2 
mtpc 
PolS 1.000                 
VA 0.710 1.000                
Polgov 0.929 0.920 1.000               
GE 0.687 0.804 0.804 1.000              
RQ 0.673 0.754 0.770 0.894 1.000             
Ecogov 0.699 0.802 0.810 0.976 0.969 1.000            
RL 0.803 0.834 0.885 0.900 0.872 0.919 1.000           
CC 0.713 0.721 0.775 0.853 0.821 0.861 0.868 1.000          
Instgov 0.785 0.805 0.859 0.907 0.876 0.917 0.965 0.965 1.000         
G.gov 0.839 0.883 0.930 0.942 0.915 0.955 0.968 0.912 0.973 1.000        
Trade 0.291 0.094 0.212 0.156 0.085 0.126 0.234 0.219 0.234 0.200 1.000       
FDI -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 -0.18 -0.15 -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 0.317 1.000      
Edu -0.28 -0.30 -0.32 -0.42 -0.37 -0.41 -0.38 -0.39 -0.40 -0.39 -0.36 -0.08 1.000     
Credit 0.338 0.491 0.445 0.575 0.526 0.584 0.519 0.524 0.540 0.550 0.143 -0.10 -0.42 1.000    
NODA -0.11 -0.02 -0.07 -0.21 -0.26 -0.24 -0.15 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.01 0.340 0.140 -0.16 1.000   
IHDI 0.458 0.394 0.462 0.608 0.526 0.585 0.552 0.551 0.571 0.567 0.453 0.015 -0.54 0.559 -0.389 1.000  
CO2mtpc 0.356 0.387 0.401 0.557 0.419 0.506 0.454 0.517 0.502 0.494 0.285 -0.02 -0.46 0.712 -0.231 0.651 1.000 
                  
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation 
Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance.  FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Corruption-Control. Instgov: Institutional 
Governance. Ggov: General Governance. GDP: Gross Domestic Product growth. Popg: Population growth. Educ: Education quality. 
CO2mtpc: CO2 emissions per capita.  
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